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We analyze the effect of fertility on income per capita with a particular focus on the experience of
Europe. For European countries with below-replacement fertility, the cost of continued low fertility
will only be observed in the long run. We show that in the short run, a fall in the fertility rate will lower
the youth dependency ratio and increase the working-age share, thus raising income per capita. In
the long run, however, the burden of old-age dependency dominates the youth dependency decline,
and continued low fertility will lead to small working-age shares in the absence of large migration
inflows. We show that the currently very high working-age shares generated by the recent declines
in fertility and migration inflows are not sustainable, and that significant drops in the relative size of
the working-age population should be expected. Without substantial adjustments in labor force participation
or migration policies, the potential negative repercussions on the European economy are large.
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  The impact of demographic change on economic development has long been debated. 
Although the Malthusian hypothesis that population growth is constrained by available resources 
held a central position for centuries, the simultaneous occurrence of economic growth and 
population growth over long periods of time has demanded new models of the interplay between 
these phenomena (Becker, Glaeser et al. 1999; Galor and Weil 1999; Galor and Weil 2000; 
Galor 2005). Little consensus has been reached during the last 50 years on the effect of 
population growth on economic growth. For example, Kelley and Schmidt (1995) find no 
correlation between population growth and economic development in the 1960s and 1970s, yet 
find evidence of a negative relationship emerging in the 1980s. This later relationship appears to 
be even stronger when other demographic factors such as age structure are controlled for (Kelley 
and Schmidt 2005).  
 
The concept of “optimum population growth” is an old debate (Samuelson 1975; 
Deardorff 1976; Samuelson 1976).  Further debate over the effects of population pressure on 
economic development remains fervent (Simon 1996; Ehrlich 2008). Ehrlich argues that 
population pressure on natural resources and the environment is a contemporary issue that has 
been ignored by policy makers. Simon takes an alternative view and stresses the benefits of the 
technological progress that he argues is a natural concomitant of population growth. Larger 
populations make innovation more likely, and moreover, increase the scope for technological 
adoption. These assumptions are central in the more recent endogenous growth literature 
focusing on research and development as main drivers of economic growth (Strulik 2005). 
  
  Early work by Bloom and Freeman and by others highlights the importance of analyzing 
the effect on economic growth of the individual components of population growth: fertility and 
mortality (Bloom and Freeman 1988; Kelley 1988; Brander and Dowrick 1994; Kelley and 
Schmidt 1995; Kelley and Schmidt 2005). In this paper we highlight the fertility channel, and in 
particular draw on the experience of European countries.   
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For many, but not all, countries in the world the decline in fertility in the last 45 years has 
been rapid. The onset of a rapid fertility decline is a signal that a country is undergoing the 
demographic transition from high fertility (and high mortality) to low fertility (and low 
mortality). In Figure 1 we show the change in fertility that occurred between 1960 and 2000 
relative to the initial fertility rate in 1960. Virtually all countries that had a fertility rate below 5.5 
in 1960 experienced a decline in fertility
2 – these countries are or have been undergoing the 
demographic transition
3. Countries that had a fertility rate above 5.5 in 1960 either experienced 
rapid decline in fertility and thus are part of the demographic transition trajectory, or maintained 
high fertility levels and remain today in a high-fertility and high-mortality state. 
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Total fertility rate 1960
Source: World Bank (2007)
 
Source:  World Bank (2007) 
 
To highlight the change in fertility in Europe between 1960-2000 Figure 2 illustrates the 
same relationship as in Figure 1 for the European countries.  
                                                 
2 Gabon is an exception to this pattern.  
 
3 It should be noted that by 1960 most of the demographic transition had been completed in European countries.   3
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Total fertility rate 1960
Source: World Bank (2007)
 
 
In 1960, Estonia was the only European country to have a total fertility rate below two, at 
1.96. Today all but two countries in Europe (Albania and Iceland) have a total fertility rate below 
two. The reasons for the rapid decline in fertility in Europe, and its decline to “lowest of the low” 
rates are varied (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Kohler, Billari et al. 2002; Billari, Frejka et al. 
2004; Billari and Kohler 2004; Aarssen 2005; Adsera 2006; Adsera 2006; Bjorklund 2006; 
Coleman 2006; Kohler 2006; McDonald 2006; Feyrer 2007). Fertility decline in Europe is 
thought to be due to socioeconomic incentives to delay childbearing, a decline in the desired 
number of children, and institutional factors (labor market rigidities, lack of child care, changing 
gender roles) (Bongaarts and Bulatao 1999; Kohler, Billari et al. 2002; Garrido and Malo 2005; 
Kohler 2006). Eastern European societies have also undergone major economic, political and 
social change. 
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Presently, Eastern and Western European countries share an important demographic 
feature: below-replacement fertility.  The economic consequences of below-replacement fertility 
are not well understood. In this paper, we aim to analyze this relationship.  We argue that while 
declines in fertility generally induce positive economic outcomes in the short run, the same is not 
necessarily true in the long run. In the long run, below-replacement fertility is likely to lead to 
age structures that are sub-optimal with respect to their economic growth implications. The exact 
magnitude of these effects depends on a host of demographic, social, and political factors. These 
factors critically shape the long-term development of age structure as well as the interactions 
between age structure and the economy.  
 
The analysis in this paper naturally links to previous work on the “low fertility trap” 
(Billari and Kohler 2004; Lutz and Skirbekk 2005; McDonald 2006). McDonald (2008) argues 
that when fertility levels are below 1.5, it is difficult to raise fertility, due to changes in norms 
(through socialization) and preferences regarding the number of children. Moreover, increased 
opportunities for women in the workplace coupled with heightened consumerism, and the 
demographic, mechanical effect of fewer women entering the childbearing age-group have 
contributed to persistently low birth rates.  Open for debate among these authors is the threshold 
fertility rate at which countries enter the “trap” and how countries can escape the trap. Feyrer, 
Sacerdote and Stern (2008) draw a more optimistic picture of general fertility trends, arguing that 
fertility will go up again as countries adopt new social norms and facilitate the combination of 
labor force participation and motherhood. 
 
 In this paper we do not model the dynamics of fertility directly, but rather explore the 
long-term relationship between fertility levels and the relative size of the workforce. We thus 
formalize and generalize the issues raised in the above literature, without making specific 
assumptions regarding the long-term determinants of family size. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we discuss the basic 
mechanisms through which fertility affects economic growth and highlight the non-linear long-
run relationship between fertility and the working-age share.  In section 3, we discuss recent 
trends in fertility, migration and the working-age share in Western Europe and show that   5
working-age share has not fallen yet, despite fertility levels below replacement. We summarize 
and discuss our results in section 4. 
 




There are three theoretical channels through which fertility affects economic 
development: population growth with fixed resources (the Malthusian theory), the Solow capital 
stock effect, and the age structure effect.  According to the Malthusian hypothesis, larger 
populations imply lower resources per capita in the presence of a fixed factor (land is frequently 
given as an example), and thus lower income per capita. A similar, yet slightly more subtle 
mechanism is at play in the Solow growth model (Solow 1956) where capital stock is built up 
through savings, and declines with depreciation. With constant returns to scale, population 
growth works in the same way as capital depreciation and thus lowers steady-state income per 
capita in the traditional Solow model. 
 
The third link between fertility and economic growth, and the main focus of this paper, is 
age structure. The age structure of a population follows from the historical sequence of fertility, 
mortality, and net migration, and directly determines the relative size of the working-age 
population. Since output is measured in per capita terms, the fact that labor force participation 
rates vary by age means that the working-age share directly affects income per capita through the 
number of workers per capita. A decline in fertility reduces the number of children, thus 
unambiguously raising the working-age share and – as long as participation rates do not change –
increasing labor supply per capita in the short run (Bloom and Freeman 1986). 
 
The same argument does not hold in the long run. As we show in further detail below, 
persistently high fertility levels imply an age distribution strongly skewed towards the young 
generations in steady-state. On the other hand, sustained low fertility levels like the ones 
currently observed across Europe imply very large relative sizes for the old and economically 
inactive cohorts in steady-state.     6
 
2.2 A Simple Model of Age Structure 
 
The intuition for the basic mechanism linking fertility levels and age structure in the long run can 
best be provided by a simple population model. Assume a stable population
4 with three age 
groups: the young, the middle age, and the old, where the size of the middle age group is 








people in the young group as long as we also 
assume that all individuals die at the end of the second period. In this setting, the age distribution 












Assuming that only the middle age group works, the working-age share w of the population can 













This framework is similar to the models derived in Weil (1999) and Hock and Weil (2007), and 
has intuitive properties. First, at replacement fertility,
6 the working-age share is 1/3. Second, 
deviations from replacement rate fertility unambiguously lead to a decline in the working-age 
share. For high fertility levels, the first term in the denominator (
2
f
) becomes large; this is the 
typical developing country scenario with high youth dependency and very low old-age 






 becomes large, capturing the burden of very large old cohorts relative to the size of the 
                                                 
4 A stable population refers to a population that has constant age-specific fertility and mortality rates, which, in the 
absence of migration, implies a constant age structure and constant population growth.  
5 The total number of births is the age-group-specific population times f/2. Thus, to get a birth cohort size of 1, we 
need a “parent cohort” population of 2/f. 
6 In the case with zero mortality before old age, replacement fertility equals 2.   7
working-age cohorts. Figure 3 illustrates the theoretical relationship between stable population 
fertility levels and working-age shares expressed in equation (2).   
 




























The basic mechanism outlined in our simple model has ignored two important influences on the 
age structure: mortality and migration. Incorporating mortality in the basic framework is 
relatively easy: high mortality rates have two principal effects: first, they lower the number of 
females reaching age 45 and thus giving birth, as well as the number of children surviving early 
childhood. As a result, the relative size of the young cohorts associated with a given total fertility 
rate declines.  
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The second mortality effect comes through aging. Let us define σ as the fraction of 
people that survives to old age, i.e. does not die at the end of period two
7. Then one can rewrite 
















with  1 σ ≤ . Lower old age survival implies a lower old-age dependency ratio and thus a higher 
working-age share. Solving for the fertility rate that maximizes working-age share in steady-state, 

















The working-age share maximizing steady-state fertility rate f
* is thus given by 
  
 
* 2 f σ =  (5) 
 
 
If  1 σ = , a total fertility rate f=2 is the unique solution
8. The lower the old-age survival, the 
lower the working-age-share maximizing fertility rate.
9  This result is intuitive. If  1 σ < , the 
relative weight of the old is strictly smaller than the relative weight generated by the young, so 
that the working-age-share maximizing fertility rate is strictly below 2.  
 
To further illustrate this point, we simulate stable population outcomes for representative 
survival schedules for populations at different stages of development. Rather than assuming three 
broad age groups, we calculate the stock of each age group based on a given fertility and 
mortality schedule where the working age covers the ages 15-64. For each mortality/fertility 
                                                 
7 In this stylized framework, we assume for analytical simplicity that agents die either at the end of the second or the 
end of the third period. One can, however, interpret σ as the average fraction of people from the previous cohort still 
alive over the last period of life, in which case death could occur any time during the last period of life. 
8 We restrict the domain of our analysis to the set of positive real numbers. 
9 As this fertility rate can be above or below the replacement fertility rate, the working-age-share maximizing stable 
population fertility rate parameter will lead to positive, zero, or negative population growth. Thus we cannot assert 
that the fertility rate that maximizes the working-age share is the “optimal” fertility rate – the population growth 
consequences may impose a negative effect on economic growth.    9
schedule, we run the simulations until a stable population distribution is reached
10. The resulting 
working-age shares are summarized in Figure 4 below. The graph illustrates the relationship 
between fertility and working-age share in the long run, i.e. in a stable population framework. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show that a decrease in fertility rate below the WAS-maximizing level 
leads, in the long run, to a lower working-age share. The short-run transitional dynamics look 
quite different, since any reduction in fertility will mechanically decrease the youth dependency 
ratio in the near term as discussed in Weil (1999). The figures thus compare steady states, and do 
not illustrate short-run dynamics. 
 
Figure 4: Stable population distribution relationship between fertility and working-age 





























Life expectancy 40 years (Historical Life Tables)
Life expectancy 40 years (Zambia 2005)
Life expectancy 60 years (Yemen 2005)
Life expectancy 80 years (France 2005)
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between fertility and working-age shares for different life 
tables (World Health Organization). The figure shows that the basic inverse U-shape relationship 
                                                 
10 We initiate the simulation with a flat age structure, and then impose constant age-specific fertility and mortality 
rates to impute the stock of each age group in each period. It takes up to 200 simulated periods for age structure to 
converge to a stable population distribution. In Figure 4 we show the resulting stable population working-age share 
for three examples of mortality schedules and fertility rates between zero and ten.    10
between fertility and working-age shares outlined in equations (2) and (3) persists, independent 
of the mortality schedule applied.  
 
Figure 4 also highlights the differential impact of life expectancies at different levels of 
fertility. Although life expectancy has very limited effects at very high fertility levels, high levels 
of old-age survival significantly lower the working-age share for low rates of fertility. As 
revealed by equation (5), the fertility rate that maximizes the working-age share depends on the 
relative size of the old cohorts. In France, with a life expectancy of 80 years, the burden from the 
large old generations is greater than the burden from young generations, so that the working-age-
share-maximizing fertility rate in steady-state is 2.6, significantly above replacement. In Yemen, 
with a life expectancy of 60 in 2005, the relative burden of the young and the old is similar in 
magnitude, so that we get an optimal steady-state fertility rate of 1.9. In Zambia, with a life 
expectancy of 40 years, youth dependency is more relevant than old-age dependency, so the 
optimal steady-state total fertility rate is relatively low at 1.7.  
 
The optimal fertility rate for Zambia is particularly low due to the rather peculiar 
mortality profile generated by the HIV epidemic. In Figure 5 we compare today’s survival curves 
in Zambia with a historical life table generating a Zambian life expectancy of 40 years.  
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Historical life table: life expectancy 40 years
Zambia life table 2005: life expectancy 40 years
 
Source: United Nations (1982), WHO (2008).  
 
The historical survival curves associated with a life expectancy of 40 years imply 
extremely high under-five mortality (close to 30%), and relatively low and constant mortality 
afterwards. In comparison, infant and mortality rates are relatively low in Zambia today, while 
adult mortality (mostly generated by HIV) is significantly higher. The shift in mortality from 
childhood to adult life implies a very different stable population distribution. With the historical 
tables, the burden of high fertility levels is lower than the respective burden with modern Zambia 
survival rates; as a result, the working-age-share maximizing fertility rate is 2.1, significantly 
above the optimal rate, 1.7, for present day Zambia. 
 
It should be stressed at this point that our analysis completely abstracts from population 
growth. The fertility levels maximizing the working-age shares under the different life 
expectancy assumptions can be associated with very different growth rates. The working-age-
share maximizing rate for France (2.8) implies positive population growth of 0.8% per year; the 
corresponding rates for Yemen and Zambia imply population growth rates of -2% and -0.7%. As   12
discussed in the introduction, the basic relation between population growth and income per 
capita remains unclear, and will not be discussed further in this paper. 
 
The focus of this paper instead lies in quantifying the magnitude of the effect of 
demographic shifts on age structure. In the graphs and calculations made above, we have defined 
working age as being the age range 15-64.  In the European case, a majority of workers retire 
around 60 (Gruber and Wise 1999; Gruber and Wise 2004), which means that the working-age 
shares calculated before are likely to be overly optimistic. In Figure 6 we simulate stable 
population working-age-shares for a range of retirement ages using the French survival schedule. 
At retirement age 55, the burden of the old is particularly large, implying a working-age-share-
maximizing fertility rate of 3.1. If, on the other hand, the working age would go all the way up to 
age 70, the WAS-maximizing fertility rate would fall to 2.0.   
 
 Figure 6: Stable population distribution relationship between fertility and working-




























Average retirement age: 55
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An analogous picture emerges when we change the assumptions regarding the lower 
bound of the working age to reflect differences in the years of schooling and the resulting 
differences in the timing of labor force entry. As Figure 7 illustrates, later entry into the labor 
force mechanically lowers the working-age share. Later entry into the labor force is associated 
with a higher relative burden generated by the young cohorts, and thus lower working-age-share-
maximizing fertility levels. 
 
Figure 7: Stable population distribution relationship between fertility and working-
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The second main channel omitted in the basic model outlined in this section is 
immigration. Immigrants generally display reproductive behavior different from the population 
in their host countries (Fernandez and Fogli 2006) and also directly affect the age distribution of 
countries. The exact effect of migration on age structure depends on the average age of the 
migrants, as well as on the duration of stay.  Immigrants arriving during their working age and   14
leaving before retirement increase the relative size of the working-age population and labor force 
of their host country, and lower the working-age share in their country of origin. We provide a 
detailed discussion of this issue in the following section where we analyze the implications of 
low fertility levels for Europe. 
 
The third main factor to be considered in the analysis of fertility trajectories is behavioral 
change. Changes in fertility are likely to change labor force participation rates of women (and 
possibly men too) (Bloom and Freeman 1987; Bloom, Canning et al. 2007), but are also likely to 
lead to changes in the accumulation of human and physical capital (Bloom, Canning et al. 2007; 
Lee and Mason 2008). These factors imply positive externalities generated by low fertility levels 
in the long run that may partially offset the negative working-age-share effects highlighted here. 
 
3. Fertility in Western Europe 
 
Total fertility levels have continued to decline over the last decades, falling from an 
average of 2.4 in 1970 to an average of 1.5 in 2005 (World Bank 2007). This decline in fertility 
to levels in most cases significantly below replacement, has, however, not led to falling working-
age shares as predicted in the long-run stable population model presented in the last section. As 
Figure 8 illustrates, the working-age share in all Western European countries (except Finland) 
has actually increased between 1970 and 2005. This is partially the result of the dynamics of the 
working-age share adjustments to lower fertility levels as highlighted by Bloom, Canning, and 
Sevilla (2003). An initial decline in fertility will lower the youth dependency ratio and 
mechanically increase the working-age share in the short run. Over a lifetime horizon, the 
smaller sized cohorts move through the population age groups and the new stable population 
distribution will be achieved if fertility, mortality, and net migration remain constant. However, 
as shown in Figure 8, this dynamic has not yet materialized in Europe.   
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Working-age-share 1970 Working-age-share 2005
 
From a long-term (stable population) perspective, most of the declines in fertility are 
recent. In 1960, all European countries had a total fertility rate above 2; in 1970 only a small 
group of countries in Northern Europe had fallen below the threshold of 2 children per woman. 
Consequently, the generations currently retiring in most countries with a low total fertility rate 
still bore more than two children on average, which keeps old-age dependency rates moderate, 
while youth dependency rates have fallen dramatically. Once the generations who have fewer 
than two children on average begin to retire, working-age-shares will fall if fertility levels stay 
below replacement and all other factors remain unchanged.   
 
Positive short-term effects are, however, not the only reason why working-age shares 
have remained high in Europe. The second main factor contributing to the currently high levels   16
of working-age-shares is migration. Since most immigrants are young (Malmberg 2008), 
migration has a direct and positive effect on working-age-shares. Most Western European 
countries have experienced significant migration inflows over the last decades. As summarized 
in Table 1 below, immigrants (defined as current residents with foreign citizenships) constitute 
between 2.1 (Finland) and 20% (Switzerland) of the current population. More importantly, net 
migration remains positive for most countries. While an average current inflow of 4 immigrants 
per 1000 population, the effect of migration on population levels and working-age shares can be 
shown to be quite small. 
 








share of foreign 
nationals (%) 
Estimated annual 
net migration per 
1000 population
Austria 8,230 789 9.58 4.39
Belgium 10,500 871 8.29 3.50
Denmark 5,420 268 4.94 1.70
Finland 5,250 108 2.06 1.28
France 60,900 3,623 5.95 2.40
Germany 82,500 7,288 8.83 2.43
Ireland 4,160 255 6.14 9.47
Italy 58,600 2,402 4.10 3.87
Netherlands 16,300 699 4.29 1.37
Norway 4,620 213 4.62 3.70
Spain 43,400 3,371 7.77 13.61
Sweden 9,020 481 5.33 3.40
Switzerland 7,440 1,525 20.49 2.72
United Kingdom  60,200 3,066 5.09 3.20
  Population-weighted average  6.63 4.18
Source: Eurostat (2008), United Nations (2007)    
 
One way to illustrate the mixed medium- to long-run effects of migration is to simulate 
counterfactual historical population under the assumption that migration flows over the last 
decades were zero. The thought experiment we conduct is the following: how different would 
European working-age shares look today under the assumption that no migration had happened 
in Europe over the last 45 years? Given that we know the historical age structure and subsequent 
fertility and mortality rates, this simulation is relatively simple to implement under the   17
simplifying assumption that mortality and fertility levels would have been the same in the 
absence of migration. i.e. that immigrants have the same fertility and mortality rates as the 
domestic population. 
 
Figure 9 compares the simulated to the actual age structure for Austria as a country with 
relatively high immigration flows over the last 40 years. While the total population is by 
construction lower in the simulated scenario (7.6 vs. 8.2 million in 2005), the graph highlights 
the highly non-linear effect of migration on the age distribution. Immigration has led to slightly 
larger population shares in the age groups 35-39 and 40-44; however, the opposite is true for 
some of the old-age groups.  
 
Figure 9: Actual age structure and simulated age structure in the absence of 












































Actual age structure 2005
Simulated age structure 2005
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Overall, the effect of historical migration on the current size of the working-age share is 
very small: while the actual working age share was 67.8% in 2005, our simulation results imply 
that the share would have been 68.5% in the absence of migration. In short, migration over the 
last 45 years has undoubtedly increased the total population in Austria, but has had very little 
effect on the actual size of the working-age share. 
 
The second, and much bigger, problem with the argument that migration can solve future 
age structure problems, lies in the political feasibility of continued immigration inflows. With 
increasing domestic resentment against immigration documents by the wide-spread popularity of 
right-wing parties across European countries, immigration policies have been tightened 
significantly and are likely to severely reduce migration inflows in the future. 
 
In short, migration is highly unlikely to have a major effect on falling working-age shares 
in Western European countries over the next decades. The size of the economic repercussions of 
declining working-age shares on economic development, however, will critically depend on 
individual behavior. With increasing life expectancies and smaller family sizes many aspects of 
societies are bound to change. 
 
In Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay (2007) we show that each extra child lowers a 
female’s labor force participation by approximately 1.9 years over an average working life. With 
lower fertility levels, female labor force participation increases and has important positive 
second-order effects on income per capita. This relationship, however, appears different in 
European countries, where fertility is clustered in a relatively small range as shown in Figure 7. 
Engelhardt and Prskawetz (2004) argue that in fact the relationship between fertility and female 
labor force participation in Europe is positive when looking at the changes within countries 
across time.  This finding, however, appears to be confounded by other country-specific trends 
and is reversed once country-specific factors are fully accounted for (Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000; Vlasblom and Schippers 2004).  
   19

















































































1 1.5 2 2.5
Total fertility rate
Source: World Bank (2007), ILO (2007)
 
Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics (2007), World Bank (2007) 
 
Changing fertility may also affect savings behavior. From a life-cycle perspective, 
children and savings can be viewed as substitutes in terms of old-age security. In the absence of 
formal capital markets, children may act as a more reliable form of savings for old-age support 
than financial savings. As capital markets develop, parents can substitute towards savings and 
lower the demand for children (Ehrlich and Kim 2007).  
 
Lee and Mason (2008) argue that smaller family sizes do not necessarily lead to lower 
aggregate human capital. According to the Lee-Mason model, households contribute a fixed 
proportion of resources to fund the education of all the children. When the number of children 
per household declines, investment in each child’s education increases proportionately.   
Accordingly, as these children age and enter the workforce, the aggregate amount of human 
capital is not compromised even though the number of people entering the workforce is now 
lower.  




In this paper we have explored the effect of fertility on income per capita in the short and 
long run.  In the short run, a decline in the fertility rate unambiguously increases income per 
capita as youth dependency falls and the working-age share increases. As we have shown in the 
theoretical framework presented in section 2 of this paper, the relationship between fertility and 
age structure in steady-state is more complex in the long run. Although it is true that very high 
fertility levels have a negative effect on output per capita through low working-age shares, the 
positive effects of lowering fertility only exist up to the rate at which working-age share is 
maximized; any fertility decline below this maximizing rate lowers the working-age share in 
equilibrium and may induce a reduction in output per capita. In high-fertility countries such as 
Zambia, the message is clear: lower fertility will increase income per capita. For low-fertility 
European countries, the implications of fertility decline are more complex: lower fertility will 
increase income per capita in the short run, but decrease it in the long run. This poses a policy 
conundrum for European policymakers.   
 
In most Western European countries, continued net immigration and the relatively recent 
decline in fertility have bolstered working-age shares to today’s levels. However, given the 
growing aversion to further immigration exhibited in many European countries and the resulting 
increase in migration restrictions, the scope for large future immigration inflows seems very 
limited at the moment. If fertility levels stay at current levels, or fall further, declines in the 
working-age share of the population will occur over the next decades and depress income per 
capita gains. With a life expectancy of 80 years, our simulations imply that the long-run 
working-age shares will drop to somewhere between 50% and 55% if fertility levels stay at 
current levels. Comparing this with the current working-age shares close to 70% in most 
European countries implies a reduction in the number of workers per capita of around 25% under 
the assumption that average participation rates remain unchanged. Even though this adjustment 
is likely to happen over several decades, the resulting negative growth effects will clearly be 
noticed, especially by those economies with already modest economic growth. 
   21
The exact magnitude of these effects, however, critically depends on the many policies 
affecting labor force participation, particularly social security regulations (Gruber and Wise 
1998; Blondal and Scarpetta 1999; Gruber and Wise 1999; Gruber and Wise 2004). Adjusting 
institutional settings such as social security, child care, and education will not only be important 
to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability, but also to lessen and possibly avoid negative income 
effects generated by demographic change.  
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